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Sir Gus O’Donnell recently delivered a lecture at the LSE on his time in the civil service.
What follows is his overview of the triumphs and disasters, as well as his ten
commandments of good policy making.  
In this article, I will review some of  the lessons I have, sometimes painf ully, absorbed
over my time in the Civil Service. I will start with policy triumphs and f ailures and then
consider the implications f or how the public sector is run and how it needs to evolve. I
f ind it usef ul to remember the motto that Wimbledon tennis f inalists see at centre court
‘If you can meet with triumph and disaster and treat those two impostors just the same’
There is as much to be learned f rom success as f rom f ailure. Accountability, if  it  is to work well, needs to
encourage well managed risk taking not to promote risk aversion. So let’s start with some triumphs, f irst
in economic policy as this is the area I know best.
Triumph no 1: the Labour government’s decision not to join the Euro  
It is easy to look back at this decision and say it was obvious. But many senior members of  the
government, including prime minister Tony Blair and leading commentators, were strongly in f avour of  the
UK joining f rom the start or as soon as possible. The decision not to join was a triumph of  polit ics in
that the polit icians made the right decision and what I believe was a triumph f or economic analysis.
The test carried out by HM Treasury was a comprehensive cost-benef it analysis of  the pros and cons of
joining. It has stood the test of  t ime. If  only it had been translated into Greek. And having given credit to
the last Labour government f or deciding not to join, I should also add that they would not have had that
option if  it  had not been f or John Major ’s success in getting the UK an opt-out f rom monetary union.
The lesson I draw f rom this is the need to have an objective, thorough analysis of  key economic
decisions. Indeed I would go f urther and suggest that f uture decisions of  similar importance should have
their analysis crosschecked with the Of f ice of  Budget Responsibility (OBR). This could expand to cover
major policy issues like the High Speed Rail Link. Where is the logic of  having the OBR looking into the
details of  every budget decision, some quite trivial, and not looking at f ar more important policy issues
where departments other than HM Treasury are in the lead?
Second triumph: the establishment of an independent monetary policy committee to set
interest rates 
This was an interesting and rare example of  polit icians ceding power to technocrats. It has succeeded in
de-polit icising this subject and has enhanced accountability. The greater openness, with voting made
public, regular press conf erences and scrutiny f rom the Treasury Select Committee, has worked well. Of
course, monetary policy has not been perf ect. It never will be whatever the institutional arrangements,
but I believe the new arrangements have produced better results than would have been the case under
the f ormer arrangements.
I stress that this is a belief  and it is certainly an assertion that could be challenged. However the
accountability gain is clearly very substantial. I should add that the coalit ion government’s decision to set
up the OBR is another triumph that I expect in t ime will have just as posit ive an impact. But we should be
caref ul not to measure the OBR’s success by its f orecasting record. Its main achievement is to de-
polit icise the f orecast and to ensure objective costings of  policy decisions. I would hope that the OBR
might reduce the bias in certain f orecasts but I doubt that it will reduce the standard errors very much.
My third triumph: microeconomic examples 
There are so many that spring to mind it is dif f icult to choose one: the use of  dif f erential taxes to
persuade everyone to convert to unleaded petrol; the contrast between lung cancer rates in France and
the UK resulting f rom successive decisions by Chancellors to increase taxes on cigarettes; the abolit ion
of  exchange controls; the privatisation of  companies like Cable and Wireless, BT, Brit ish Airways that led
to massive increases in productivity; and, more recently, having started to exploit advances in
behavioural science that are incredibly promising.
Some of  these triumphs represent the application of  well accepted economic principles. Others, like
removing exchange restrictions and privatisation were hotly contested at the time. The lesson I draw
f rom both examples is that there is an important place in applying standard economic solutions to many
public policy issues, but there is also a case f or well managed, but risky, init iatives. As Nigel Lawson made
clear in ‘The View From No 11: ‘if  he had waited f or a consensus to emerge ‘we would still have exchange
control today’. Sometimes you have to try something new because, unf ortunately in the social sciences,
we rarely have evidence f rom controlled experiments. Ideally we would use controlled experiments f ar
more of ten. I am delighted that a lot of  the work of  the so called ‘nudge unit’ is being taken f orward using
caref ully constructed experiments in dif f erent parts of  the country.
Now the disasters
The f irst I would choose is the poll tax, or community charge to give it its of f icial name. Economists have
long argued that poll taxes are the least distortionary of  all taxes. However, as good economists know,
they went on to argue that it may well be necessary to of f set any adverse distributional impact by other
means. The poll tax would have resulted in ‘a pensioner couple in Inner London paying 22 per cent of
their net income in poll tax whereas a better of f  couple in the suburbs would pay 1 per cent’.  A report by
Department of  Energy of f icials described the poll tax as ‘completely unworkable and polit ically
catastrophic’. The Treasury were f irmly opposed to its introduction. The poll tax did indeed prove
catastrophic f or the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
So what lessons should we draw f rom this episode? The f irst I call the Irish axiom: don’t start f rom the
wrong point. Successive governments had allowed the f inancing of  local government to become more
and more centralised. This destroyed local accountability. The problem is still with us and I would be
surprised if  it  is solved at all soon. The problem is that radical changes are now needed and that means
large numbers of  winners and losers. And the iron law of  tax changes is that the losers scream and the
winners remain silent. The second lesson is the need to have the Treasury on your side if  you are
making big changes. Money will be needed to compensate the screamers. If  the Treasury aren’t
supportive the money will not be f orthcoming, the policy will f ail, and the Treasury will be the f irst with the
‘I told you so’ response.
I have heard some argue that the poll tax was the triumph of  economics over polit ics. I think you have to
take a very narrow view of  economics to make that case, but it certainly reinf orces the point that, where
distributional issues are important, it is vital to have clear political decisions which have cabinet support.
The second disaster must be our f ailure to spot the f inancial crisis of  2008 and the associated f ailures
in the regulatory system. It is clear the regulatory system created incentives f or excessive risk-taking in
part because it was believed that the government would bail out the banks if  the crisis was large enough.
I take my share of  the blame f or this episode; I thought the banks knew what they were doing. That was
wrong.
It took remarkable courage and persistence f rom the then prime minister Gordon Brown to bring the G20
together in London and help to prevent a retreat into protectionism and an even worse recession. And,
as Alastair Darling explained in an earlier lecture at the LSE, he and Mervyn King had to work extremely
hard to save the UK banks f rom complete collapse.
Some lessons are clear: we need to revise the regulatory system, ideally in a globally coordinated way;
we need to have ways of  handling banks deemed ‘too big to f ail’. There is a lot to be learned f rom
countries like Canada that weathered the storm remarkably well.
For my third f ailure I will use a microeconomic example; namely, the f ailure to agree on a planning system
that achieves our desired goals. Every time there is a recession, or even of  a reduction in growth below
trend, there is a call f or more ‘structural ref orms’. Top of  the list is always the planning system. It is
blamed f or holding back growth and development. The problem is, in f act, a classic example of  not being
clear about the outcome that is desired. If  it  is to boost GDP, then the answer is simple: concrete over
the South East. But of  course that’s not what we want and that’s because you would have to be an idiot
to want to maximise GDP. It ’s a highly f lawed measure and I am pleased that we are at last starting to
think more broadly about how as a society we measure success. I want to pay tribute to LSE’s Richard
Layard f or his t ireless work on happiness and on the need to tackle mental health issues. The good
news is that we are starting to apply the best economics to these issues. I am hopef ul that the recent
advances in methods of  valuing environmental goods and bads will help decision makers make better
choices once they are clear about what they want to achieve.
Good Policymaking
As I look back on all these events over my 30 years in the Civil Service some patterns emerge of  what
brings success. My ten commandments of  good policy making are listed below:
1)    Thou shalt  be clear about the outcomes that you want to achieve
Lack of  strategic clarity, of  knowing the problem you are trying to solve, is a cardinal sin.
2)    Thou shalt  evaluate policy as objectively as possible
You need to be clear about how you are going to determine success. It is essential to relate the success
measure to the desired outcome. This may sound obvious but f ar too of ten it is not done.
3)    Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbour’s policies
Most important policies operate across departmental boundaries so be sure to have collective buy in,
and ownership of , the policy. We can’t tackle the problems of  an ageing society or obesity or climate
change simply by operating in one department.
4)    Thou shall not assume the government has to solve every problem
In a f uture lecture I will talk about the 3 kinds of  problems that we f ace.  We have models in our heads,
and sometimes written down, about how we think people, companies and governments make decisions.
These models are probably embarrassingly naïve. As Keynes said many of  us are slaves to some
def unct economist. These three types of  model f ailures must all be addressed.
5)    Thou shalt  not rush to legislate
It is a f act that all our ministers sit in either the House of  Commons or the Lords which are bodies that
spend a very large amount of  t ime legislating. My experience suggests legislation should be something of
a last resort to be used when all the other possibilit ies have been tried and f ound wanting.
6)   Honour the evidence and use it  to make decisions
There are now lots of  excellent think-tanks. We also have the internet and masses of  academic
research. If  the policy submission doesn’t cover, f or example, what works in other countries then send it
back. (There is a lot to be said f or covetting thy neighbour’s policies). The only proviso is to be clear that
most of  the time the evidence will not be clear cut. So perhaps the right answer is to generate more
evidence by the use of  experiments. In every case judgement is needed. That is the most valuable skill
needed by ministers and their senior of f icials.
7)    Thou shalt  be clear who is accountable for what and line up the powers and the
accountabilit ies
If  ministers want someone else to be directly accountable to parliament f or a specif ic area then they
need to cede power over that area to the ‘someone else’, having obeyed commandments (1) and (2).
8)    Thou shalt  not kill the messenger
Nobody’s perf ect and every organisation needs a way of  providing constructive f eedback to the senior
decision makers. If  you don’t encourage internal debate then the f irst t ime you will learn about your
mistakes will be f rom your enemies not your f riends.
9)    Thou shalt  not forget that it  is a privilege to serve
In government, the taxpayers pay our salaries and they deserve good value f or money and to know we
will always strive to f ollow the Codes that encapsulate our values.
10)  Thou shalt  keep a sense of proportion
Or in the words of  a wise, now f ormer, minister: ‘Thank God it ’s only a  game’.  For some, every bad
headline is a crisis. Keep a f ocus on what the real impact is on people’s lives.
Gus O’Donnell was speaking at the LSE as part of the British Government @ LSE events series. More
information is available here.
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